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T e disturbing story of the 2008
financial industry crisis, though
told and retold numerous times,
could begin with some reference to
the times-the "best" and the "worst."
The most recent retelling was by the
National Commission on the Causes
of the Financial and Economic Crisis
in the United States (Crisis Commis-
sion), appointed by Congress under the
Fraud Enforcement & Recovery Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
Most remarkable in the report was the
conclusion that the crisis was entirely
avoidable, that all the omens-soar-
ing mortgage debt, the proliferation of
risky mortgage products, the unsus-
tainable rise in housing prices, and
frenzied mortgage securitization-were
ignored.
Among the main protagonists identi-
fied were property appraisers and the
ratings agencies (Moody's, Standard
& Poor's, and Fitch). According to the
Crisis Commission, lenders routinely
pressured appraisers to place artificially
high prices on properties and blacklist-
ed honest appraisers, assigning business
only to appraisers who would come up
with the desired price target amounts.
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Report (Report), at 18,22,91, available
at http:/ /fcic.law.stanford.edu/report;
see also Capital West Appraisals, LLC v.
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 759 E Supp. 2d
1267 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (dismissing
complaint alleging that appraisers were
blacklisted by mortgage broker). For the
lender, an inflated value could make
the difference between closing and
losing the deal. Appraisers, in their self-
interest, succumbed to the pressure and
inflated the value of homes. Remark-
ably, however, this pressure to write
up the value of properties came not
only from mortgage brokers, lenders,
and real estate agents, but also in many
cases from the borrowers themselves,
who were anxious for their deals to go
through. Report, at 91.
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An inflated appraisal would seem
to defy economic wisdom because the
lender's ability to recoup the amount
of the loan on foreclosure is deter-
mined by the value of the property. If
the lender intends to sell the mortgage
immediately on the secondary market
rather than holding onto it, however,
then a high appraised value does
benefit the lender economically. That
is exactly what occurred in the market
bubble before the 2008 crisis. Most
home loans entered the securitization
pipeline almost immediately after the
parties left the closing table, packaged
as residential mortgage-backed securi-
ties and blessed with triple-A ratings
from the credit rating agencies. The rat-
ings were derived not from an evalu-
ation of the quality of the underlying
mortgages, a great many of which
were subprime and unmoored from
sound underwriting criteria, but from a
mathematical model developed by the
agencies. See Report, at xix, xxv, 121.
These heavy houses soon collapsed on
these very shaky foundations. Recent
reports show that nearly a quarter of
all mortgages are now underwater. See
First American CoreLogic, Negative




By and large, these players have
escaped liability to the economic losers
that relied on their work-the ratings
agencies more so than the appraisers
because ratings have been categorized
as opinions rather than factual state-
ments subject to fraud or misrepresen-
tation law. See Wyo. State Treasurer v.
Moody's Investors Serv. Inc. (In re Lehman
Bros. Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig.), 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 9567 at *42 (2d Cir.
May 11, 2011) (rejecting liability under
securities acts). But see Abu Dhabi Com-
mercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
Inc., 651 E Supp. 2d 155, 176 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (ratings made without genuine
or reasonable belief in accuracy with
a basis in fact were not mere opinions
and could be actionable misrepresenta-
tions); Jeanne Eaglesham & Jeannette
Neumann, Raters Drawing SEC Scru-
tiny, Wall St. J., June 17, 2011, at C1 (the
Securities and Exchange Commission
announcing an investigation into the
practices by these ratings agencies).
Appraisers who knowingly pre-
pared inflated appraisals as part of a
property "flipping" scheme, Hoffman
v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 290-92 (Md.
2005), or who have been shown to have
deliberately prepared a false appraisal
as part of a conspiracy to defraud or
wrongfully obtain government benefits
(such as FHA insurance), Barkley v.
Olympia Mortg. Co., Nos. 04-CV-875
(RJD) (KAM) et al., 2007 WL 2437810 at
*21 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 22, 2007); Edalatdju
v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc., 748 E Supp.
2d 860 (N.D. Ill. 2010), have been held
liable to buyer-borrowers, when it was
clear that the inflated appraisal was
the linchpin of the alleged fraud and
conspiracy See also United States v. Gee,
No. 3:07cr211, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55278 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 18,2009) (crimi-
nal charges against appraiser).
A successful liability claim based
on these theories is not at all guaran-
teed, however, because of the practical
difficulties of amassing the evidence
to sustain the claims. Fraud requires
a showing not only that the appraisal
value was incorrect but also that it was
knowingly false and made with the
intent to deceive. American Gen. Home
Equity v. Gjura, No. 102365/09,2010
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3951 (N.Y Sup. Ct.
July 16,2010). When the buyer-borrow-
er cannot plead facts supporting asser-
tions of fraud with particularity (that
is, specific fraudulent information, who
misrepresented and concealed it-the
"who, what, when, where, and why"),
the complaint is met with dismissal.
First Place Bank v. Skyline Funding, Inc.,
No. 10-CV-2044, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22349 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4,2011); Martell v.
Turcheck, No. 2:07-cv-14068, 2008 WI
2714210 (E.D. Mich. July 7,2008).
Similarly, buyer-borrowers often
fail in their claims of civil conspiracy
because of the inability to find the
facts necessary to establish that two
or more persons acted in concert to
accomplish an unlawful purpose.
See, e.g., Croye v. GreenPoint Mortg.
Funding, Inc., 740 F Supp. 2d 788
(S.D. W.Va. 2010). Pleading a con-
spiracy under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations
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Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962, though
apparently easier, presents the same
obstacles as a civil conspiracy claim
under common law. The RICO con-
spiracy statute makes it unlawful for
persons to conspire to engage in a
criminal enterprise through patterns of
racketeering activities. That act is more
comprehensive than the common law
conspiracy offense because all that is
required is a showing that one know-
ingly agrees to facilitate a scheme that
includes the operation or management
of a RICO enterprise. Smith v. Berg, 247
F.3d 532, 537 (3d Cir. 2001). It is not
necessary to have engaged in a specific
act; the defendant's knowledge of the
racketeering activity and agreement to
facilitate the scheme is enough. Salinas
v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64 (1997).
As with fraud, however, the plaintiff
must do more than attempt to construct
a conspiracy from otherwise discrete
acts. Hearns v. Parisi, 548 E Supp. 2d 132
(M.D. Pa. 2008); Martell v. Turcheck, No.
2:07-CV-14068, 2008 WL 2714210 (E.D.
Mich. July 7, 2008).
On the surface, suing in negligence
seems the most promising avenue for
recovery against appraisers, because
liability depends on an examination of
defendant's conduct alone
and does not require an
examination of defen-
dant's mental state
















risks of the loan transaction
and not with the purchaser,
who may rely on the appraisal
in making the decision to purchase.
Because of the lack of privity with the
buyer-borrowers, the appraisers had
no duty and hence no liability to them,
even when the property appraisal was
critical in the loan transaction. More-
over, even if the facts showed that the
appraiser was somehow negligent and
that injury to the buyer-borrower was
foreseeable, appraisers have asserted
the economic loss rule, which operates
to preclude recovery in a tort action
for purely economic losses, unaccom-
panied by physical injury or property
damage.
These defenses might have seemed
reasonable or appropriate in a time
when there were isolated errors in
appraisal reports, but in the world
described by the Crisis Commission,
fraught with sharp practices and dis-
honesty, a new regime seems in order.
In the last few years, some courts,
perceiving the disconnect between the
formal rules governing the conduct of
appraisers and the ends sought to be
achieved by those rules, are making
rulings aimed at some harmony and
coherence for a sensible imposition of
liability for appraisers' wrongful con-
duct. The limitations of the negligence
claim and the need for a new regime
are discussed in further detail below.
Appraisers Are Licensed
Professionals
The work of real estate appraisers is
regulated by state law. Based on their
training and experience, appraisers
must be certified, licensed, or regis-
tered. Their work is governed by rules
and regulations issued by various
legislatively created boards or agencies.
They can be disciplined or have their
certification, license, or registration
denied, suspended, or revoked for mis-
conduct; certain types of misconduct
also may subject offenders to criminal
penalties. Zumbach v. Bd. of Real Estate
Appraisers, 15 A.3d 741, 744 & n.3 (Me.
2011).
Many states (for example, Idaho,
Colorado, West Virginia, Utah) have
adopted the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice (2011)
(USPAP), prescribed by the Appraisal
Standards Board of the Appraisal
Foundation, to govern the work of local
appraisers and the communication of
reports. The preamble to USPAP states
that the purpose of the standards
is to promote and maintain a high
level of public trust in appraisal
practice by establishing require-
ments for appraisers. It is essential
that appraisers develop and com-
municate their analyses, opinions,
and conclusions to intended users
of their services in a manner that is
meaningful and not misleading.
Id. Among other things, an appraiser
must correctly complete research and
analyses necessary to produce a cred-
ible appraisal (USPAP Standard 1), be
aware of, understand, and correctly
employ those recognized methods
and techniques that are necessary to
produce a credible appraisal (USPAP
Standards R. 1-1(a)), not commit a
substantial error of omission or com-
mission that significantly affects an
appraisal (USPAP Standards R. 1-1(b)),
not render appraisal services in a
careless or negligent manner (USPAP
Standards R. 1-1(c)), and act with
honesty, impartiality, and professional
competence (USPAP Ethics Rule). To
ensure that reports are meaningful and
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reliable, the USPAP requires that an
appraisal report include a summary of
the information and data evaluated,
the appraisal methods and techniques
employed, the reasoning that supports
the analyses, opinions, and conclusions,
and a statement of all extraordinary
assumptions and hypothetical condi-
tions. USPAP Standards R. 2-1, 2-2. The
appraiser must certify that to the best
of his knowledge and belief, the report
is honest, impartial, does not reflect a
predetermined value, and is not de-
pendent on any compensation. USPAP
Standards R. 3-6.
This comprehensive legislative and
regulatory structure suggests that real
estate appraisers practice a profes-
sion involving knowledge or skill and
that their conduct should be judged
according to the tenets of their field.
Therefore, a buyer's negligence claim
against an appraiser involves profes-
sional negligence. See Brown v. Interbay
Funding, LLC, 417 E Supp. 2d 573,579
(D. Del. 2006) ("By asserting that [the
defendants] deviated from the appli-
cable standard of care required for real
estate appraisers, a claim for profes-
sional negligence is implicated"), aff'd,
198 E App'x 223 (3d Cir. 2006).
Privity of Contract as the
Source of Duty
The requirements for a cause of action
for negligence are so well written in
the law that they hardly need cita-
tion. A plaintiff must establish that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty,
the defendant breached that duty, the
plaintiff was injured, and the breach of
the duty caused the plaintiff's injury.
Although the basic elements are plain,
some embellishments attach in the case
of professional negligence; that is, the
plaintiff must show that the profes-
sional's conduct fell below the standard
of care associated with that profession.
Hice v. Lott, 223 P.3d 139, 145 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2009). The USPAP standards can
be used as evidence of the standard of
care for appraisers but are not conclu-
sive proof of the standard. Kelley v. Car-
bone, 837 N.E.2d 438,443 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005). Surely, actions and lapses such as
not visiting the property, not employ-
ing accepted valuation techniques,
making irrational assumptions, and
accepting payment for a false appraisal
easily establish a breach of the standard
of care.
Establishing a breach of the standard
of care is perhaps the least of a plain-
tiff's burden, however; an unbridge-
able chasm may lie ahead-a plaintiff
must establish that the duty that was
breached was owed to him. Whether
a duty exists is a legal question. Hice,
223 P.3d at 143. Ordinarily, a duty to
use care will arise from a contractual
relationship between the parties. This
requirement is immediately trouble-
some for the buyer-borrower who
enters into a loan transaction based on
a value assigned to the property by an
appraiser because the usual conception
of the relationship is that the appraiser
owes a duty to the party hiring the
report-typically the lender.
In some states, courts have held
as a matter of law that a real estate
appraiser owes no duty of care to a
buyer-borrower, but only to the lender,
even when the borrower must pay the
appraisal fee as a part of the closing
costs. These courts take this view on the
basis that the purpose of the appraisal
is to protect the lender from lending a
sum of money that exceeds the value
of the property to be used as a security
for the loan. See Decatur Ventures, LLC v.
Daniel, 485 F.3d 387,390 (7th Cir. 2007)
("appraisers expect lenders to use their
opinions to protect themselvesfrom
borrowers"); D.H.G. Props, LLC v. Ginn
Cos., LLC, No. 3:09-cv-735-J-34JRK, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140208, at *46 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 28, 2010) (because appraisal is
conducted for lender's own benefit and
not for benefit of borrower, no duty to
borrower arises). The mere fact that the
lender requires the borrower to pay for
the appraisal as a part of the cost of the
extension of the loan does not impose
a duty on the appraiser with respect to
the borrower. Thus, when the appraiser
has no agreement with the borrower
or the borrower's real estate broker for
the appraisal, there is no duty to the
borrower that could be the basis of a
negligence action. See Webb v. LeClair,
933 A.2d 177 (Vt. 2007); Tracht v. Ameri-
can Property Analysts, Inc., No. E-07-024,
2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 222 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jan. 25, 2008); Martell v. Turcheck,
No. 2:07-cv-14068, 2008 WL 2714210
(E.D. Mich. July 7,2008). Indeed, in
Connecticut, absent privity of contract,
an appraiser has no liability to those
who rely on the appraisal except in case
of intentional misrepresentation. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 36a-755(d); Loud v. Cimmino,
No. CV095011214S, 2010 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 517 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22,
2010). This lack of liability exists even
when the statute requires lenders to
make available a copy of the report to
borrowers.
Although the buyer-borrower
may be able to establish a contractual
relationship with the appraiser and the
lender under the third-party beneficiary
theory, Vogan v. Hayes Appraisal Assocs.,
588 N.W.2d 420,423-24 (Iowa 1999), the
burden of doing so is not an easy one.
The putative third-party beneficiary
must show that the primary parties
intended to confer the benefits of their
agreement and enforcement rights on
the third party. That intent is deter-
mined from the terms of the contract
read in the light of the circumstances,
including the motives and purposes of
the parties. Although express language
to this effect is not essential, the evi-
dence must nonetheless show that the
parties intended this result. Unfortu-
nately, most appraisal agreements do
not contain such language but almost
always expressly state that the report is
being prepared for the client (the lend-
er) and no other. See USPAP Statement
9; Partout v. Harper, 183 P.3d 771 (Idaho
2008) (no third-party beneficiary status
established when no intent to benefit
could be gleaned from the contract,
even though letter requesting appraisal
required that it be completed accord-
ing to Department of Veterans Affairs
instructions and conform to USPAP).
Foreseeability and Reliance as
Substitutes for Privity
The status of appraisers as profession-
als might well call for dispensing with
privity of contract. A host of sound
policy reasons can be articulated for
holding professionals accountable to
persons that reasonably rely on the
services offered, even if they are not
formally clients. This suggestion stems
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from the reasons for licensing profes-
sionals in the first place. Their work
involves a high degree of training, and
they hold themselves out to the public
as having particular skills and knowl-
edge. Extension of liability to noncients
is further supported by several other
factors, such as a basic assessment
of the relative positions of the parties
in the transactions in which the ap-
praiser performs, the need to prevent
unjust enrichment and to neutralize the
danger of unprovable fraud, and the
importance of providing an incentive
for honest and competent appraisals
through imposition of liability (on the
party best able to ensure that the report
is meaningful and useful for its intend-
ed purposes). Even so, equally compel-
ling notions of fairness and justice call
for some delineation of the occasions
for extending an appraiser's duties to,
and liability with respect to, nonclients.
These challenges arise rather
frequently in the attorney context.
Courts have held that a member of the
bar owes a fiduciary duty to persons,
though not strictly clients, that the law-
yer knows or should know rely on the
lawyer in his or her professional capac-
ity. Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354
(N.J. 1995); Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmerica
v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer &
Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y 1992). Con-
sequently, foreseeability has come to re-
place privity as a means of delineating
a professional's duty to a nonclient in
the legal context and the same standard
has recently been applied in the context
of determining an appraiser's liability
to a buyer-borrower. Zanaty Realty, Inc.
v. Williams, 935 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Ala.
2006) (applying theory but finding that
buyer's reliance on the appraisal report
was not foreseeable). The foresee-
ability of reliance by a borrower has
been found when an appraisal report
stated that the lender (the client) could
disclose or distribute the appraisal
report to the borrower without having
to obtain the appraiser's consent. See
Mustafa v. Anderson Appraisal Svcs., 2009
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 514 (Ct. App.
2009).
In recent times courts have ex-
tended the liability of professionals to
nonclients in the fields of accounting,
auditing, and financial advising. This
movement has occurred in an era of
increasing financial regulation of busi-
nesses aimed at facilitating informed
decision-making and oversight by
investors. See, e.g., Federated Mgmt. Co.
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 738 N.E.2d 842
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (accountants);
Caprer v. Nussbaum, 825 N.YS.2d 55
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (accountants);
Murphy v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App. 2003) (company
auditor); Baker v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
656 E Supp. 2d 226 (D. Mass. 2009)
(financial advisor). The movement to
extend liability in the case of attorneys
was not caused by any large scale or
recurrent phenomena-just a percep-
tion of a need for a new assessment in
light of evolving norms of fairness and
responsible conduct. As the move-
ment relates to property appraisals,
the Crisis Commission and others that
have studied the crisis have found that
appraisals play an integral role in most
real property transactions and that false
or inflated appraisals were among the
principal drivers of the eventual col-
lapse of the industry.
Liability to Third Parties Under
Restatement (Second) of Torts
Buyer-borrowers may be able to es-
tablish a claim against an appraiser for
negligent misrepresentation under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552,
"Information Negligently Supplied
for the Guidance of Others." Under
this section, a person in a business that
involves supplying information can be
held liable for supplying false informa-
tion and failing to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information to
(1) the persons for whose benefit and
guidance he or she intends to supply
the information and (2) others, if he or
she knows that the contracting recipi-
ent intends to supply it to such other
persons and they justifiably rely on the
information in the transaction that such
information was intended to influence.
Surprisingly, both buyer-borrowers and
appraisers have cited this section for
their respective positions: the former
as an exception to the privity require-
ment, Caruso v. Nat'l City Mortg. Co.,
931 N.E.2d 1167 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010),
and the latter to limit the class of those
entitled to rely on the appraisal. Schaaf
v. Highfield, 896 P.2d 665 (Wash. 1995).
Although there are competing views
on whether it must be shown that the
actor "knows" that the recipient will
pass the information on to others or
whether it is sufficient that the event
was foreseeable, recent cases have
taken the latter position. In Young v.
Bourland, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
3 (Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2010), the court read
the Restatement section to mean that an
appraiser is deemed to have intended
to influence its client's transaction with
a third party whenever the appraiser
knows with substantial certainty that
the third party, or the particular class
of persons to which the third party
belongs (for example, borrowers), will
rely on the representation in the course
of the transaction. In Sage v. Blagg Ap-
praisal Co., 209 P.3d 169 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2009), the court read the Restatement
as not requiring that the professional
know for a certainty that the statement
will be furnished to a third party, but
only that the professional know that
the contracting recipient (typically the
lender) intends to furnish the state-
ment to another. When the appraiser
knows that a lender must furnish the
appraisal to a buyer-borrower if asked,
he knows the lender intends to furnish it
to the buyer, within the meaning of the
Restatement. Id. at 174.
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In finding that an appraiser could
be liable to a buyer-borrower under the
circumstances in question, the court
departed from the categorical rela-
tionships (landowner-invitee; tavern
owner-patron) from which duties have
historically arisen. Instead, it found
a sufficient basis for imposing a duty
in public policy as evidenced in the
Restatement and the realities of the
loan/purchase transaction, as well
as the emerging industry guidelines
recognizing that the buyer-borrower
normally relies on the appraiser.
Id.; see also Withrow v. First Tennes-
see Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 3:04-cv-546,
2006 WL 2981295 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 16,
2006) (reasonably foreseeable that the
purchaser would rely on the appraisal
and that the misrepresentations were
not made directly to the plaintiffs was
not defeating); Zimmerman v. Logeman,
No. 09-cv-210-slc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111411 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 30,2009) ("it
does not matter whether [appraiser]
made a false statement to plaintiffs; it
only matters whether plaintiffs relied




Appraisers attempt to blunt the effect
of Restatement § 552 through express
language in the appraisal report-iden-
tifying intended users and disclaiming
any intent to benefit those that are not
intended users. USPAP defines "in-
tended user" to mean "the client and
any other party as identified, by name
or type, as users of the appraisal . .. by
the appraiser on the basis of commu-
nication with the client at the time of
the assignment." USPAP Statement 9. It
lists as intended users lenders, govern-
ment agencies, partners of a client, and
a client's attorney and accountant. Id.
USPAP further provides that a party
that receives an appraisal report from
an appraiser's client does not "become
a party to the appraiser-client relation-
ship." Such parties do not by any dis-
closure requirement "become intended
users of the report unless they were
specifically identified by the appraiser
at the time of the assignment." Id.
Although such language carries a
plain import, not all courts accept it at
face value. In Davis v. McGuigan, 325
S.W.3d 149, 159-60 (Tenn. 2010), the
disclaimer in the report stated that it
was prepared for the "sole and exclu-
sive use of the lender ... to assist with
the mortgage lending decision" and
was "not to be relied upon by third
parties for any purposes whatsoever."
Nevertheless, the Tennessee Supreme
Court found that the buyer was entitled
to rely on the conclusions in the report
because a reasonable person could have
taken the report as a statement of a
disinterested expert about the value of
the property. The report certified that
it was unbiased and true and correct.
Given the appraiser's admission that
buyers of property are interested in and
could learn of the value at which the
appraiser appraised that property from
the report, it was not unreasonable for
the appraiser to expect that the lender
would communicate the substance of
the appraisal report to the borrower
and that the result might influence the
borrower's conduct. The Sixth Circuit,
however, in Willecke v. Kozel, 395 E
App'x 160 (6th Cir. 2010), applying
Michigan law, found that language
stating expressly that the appraisal was
intended for the lender and that prohib-
ited its use by others and for any other
purpose, precluded finding a duty
of care owing to the borrower. When
an appraisal report has conflicting
language-for example, it contains lan-
guage both disclaiming use by nonci-
ents and also language that others
may rely on the appraisal report
as part of any mortgage finance
transaction that involves any
one or more of these parties-
a fact- finder could conclude
that the document invited reli-
ance by a buyer-borrower. See
Desimone v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,
No. 1:09-cv-01421-WTL-MJD,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26772
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 15,2011).
Borrowers whose loans were
eventually purchased by the Fed-
eral Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration (Freddie Mac) and the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) may be able to rely on regulations
revised in 2005. Though consistent with
USPAP (providing that "[t]he intended
use of the appraisal report is for the
lender-client to evaluate the property
that is the subject of this appraisal for a
mortgage finance transaction"), these
regulations also required appraisers to
certify their understanding that "[t]he
borrower, another lender at the request
of the borrower, the mortgagee or its
successors and assigns, mortgage insur-
ers, government sponsored enterprises,
and other secondary market partici-
pants may rely on this appraisal report
as part of any mortgage finance trans-
action that involves any one or more of
these parties." See Freddie Mac & Fan-
nie Mae, Uniform Residential Appraisal
Report, Appraiser's Certification no. 23,
www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/
forms/pdf/sellingtrans/1004.pdf (Cer-
tification 23). Explaining the purpose
of this certification, Fannie Mae states
that the acknowledgment of other
parties that often rely on the appraisal
report "is not meant to expand the list
of intended users," but only "to clarify
that others, although not intended us-
ers, often rely on the appraisal report as
part of a mortgage finance transaction."
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at 8. Indeed, notwithstanding Certifica-
tion 23, when appraisers believe that
the lender-client is the only intended
user, Fannie Mae has stated that it will
accept an additional notice that "[tihe
intended user of this appraisal report
is the lender/client. The intended use
is to evaluate the property that is the
subject of this appraisal for a mortgage
finance transaction .... No additional
intended users are identified by the
appraiser." Fannie Mae, Selling Guide,
www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/
sg/pdf/se052411.pdf, at 513.
Although the certification that others
may rely on the report may provide
the predicate for an action against an
appraiser by the relying party Fannie
Mae's clarification that the certification
does not enlarge the class of intended
users may negate this advantage,
leaving it to the courts to determine,
nonetheless, whether a borrower who
is not an intended user has a cause of
action against the appraiser. In any
event, none of the courts that have
purported to extend the class of those
entitled to rely on an appraisal report
have expressed any qualms about
doing so, and, if they did, misgivings
could be resolved on the basis that no
new burdens would befall the apprais-
ers. As professionals, appraisers are
already under an obligation to act in a
nonnegligent fashion and, even as they
should expect some amount of reliance
by buyer-borrowers, the same standard
of care would apply. The class of those
to whom the appraiser will owe this
duty would not be extended to indeter-
minate levels but would be limited to
those involved in the transaction that
triggered the appraisal report. Impor-
tantly, extending accountability will
likely foster greater adherence to the
existing standards of conduct.
Reliance for the Purchase vs.
the Loan Transaction
In sorting out the chronology of events
for a coherent narrative, some courts
have distinguished the purchase
transaction from the loan transaction,
finding no reliance or liability if the
facts show that the buyer-borrower
had already entered into a contract for
the purchase of the property before
the appraisal was conducted. When
a purchaser has signed a contract to
purchase the subject property before
the appraisal report was prepared and
does not request or obtain a copy of the
report before closing, "he will be hard
pressed to demonstrate that he relied in
any manner on the appraisal." Caruso
v. Nat'l City Mortg. Co., 931 N.E.2d
1167, 1171 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). The
fundamental flaw in this distinction is
For purposes of determining
the appraiser's liability,
the purchase transaction
cannot sensibly be separated
from the loan transaction.
revealed in the reasoning of the cases. A
distinction on the basis of two discrete
transactions does not reflect the realities
of real estate purchase transactions,
most of which depend on obtaining
financing from a lender. Indeed, the
appraisal is often the most fundamen-
tal predicate for the transaction, as
most contracts for purchase are made
contingent on obtaining financing,
which in turn depends on a satisfactory
appraisal. For purposes of determining
the appraiser's liability, the purchase
transaction cannot sensibly be separat-
ed from the loan transaction. See Edalat-
dju v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc., 748 F. Supp.
2d 860, 864-66 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (because
plaintiffs were able to obtain financ-
ing only because of the appraisal, the
purchase agreement would not have
been consummated had it not been for
the false statement of value); Borish v.
Russell, 230 P.3d 646 (Wash. Ct. App.
2010) (finding sufficient reliance on an
appraisal when the buyer-borrower
retained a contract rescission right that
the buyer-borrower could exercise only
if the appraised value was for less than
the purchase price and the buyer-bor-
rower omitted to cancel based on a false
appraisal report).
In Sage v. Blagg Appraisal Co., 209 P.3d
at 174, the Arizona Court of Appeals
recognized the purchase-loan distinc-
tion as a false one, pointing out that the
appraisal the lender orders typically is
the foundation of the home purchase
transaction. Even though ostensibly
the appraiser serves only the mort-
gage transaction and not the separate
purchase transaction, the distinction
is meaningless because a lender will
not finance the buyer's purchase if its
appraiser concludes the home is not
worth the financed amount. Because
in many cases the residential purchase
contract form gives the buyer the right
to cancel the contract if the appraisal
falls short, the court "would blink at
reality to conclude otherwise." Id. The
dual purposes of an appraisal-inform-
ing the buyer about the fairness of the
purchase price and affordability of
the anticipated loan and assessing the
sufficiency of the collateral-surely are
so apparent that they must determine
rights and responsibilities.
Economic Loss Rule
The narrative of a tort claim would
hardly be complete without discussing
the part in which the economic loss rule
rises as a monolith against the injured
plaintiff to preclude recovery. The rule
prevents a party from claiming eco-
nomic damages in a negligence claim
absent physical property damage or
bodily injury, other than the defective
product or property. Economic dam-
ages are damages for inadequate value,
costs of repair and replacement of the
defective product, or consequent loss of
profits-without any claim of personal
injury or damage to other property.
Economic loss seems to describe the
majority of claims against appraisers-
that is, the only loss is the reduced val-
ue of the property and higher mortgage
payments based on an inflated price.
The general idea behind the doctrine
is to prevent dissatisfied buyers from
using tort law to recover for poten-
tially indeterminate losses that were or
should have been protected against un-
der the contract. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameri-
tech Corp., 662 N.W.2d 652, 659 (Wis.
2003). Tort law aims to redress physical
injury whereas contract law protects
16 PROBATE & PROPERTY a November/December 2011HeinOnline  -- 25 Prob. & Prop. 16 2011
the parties' expectation interests. Borish
v. Russell, 230 P.3d at 650. This doctrine
means that even if a court were to find
a contractual relationship between the
buyer-borrower and the appraiser, if
the claimed loss is an economic loss
and no exception to the economic loss
rule applies, then the buyer-borrower
will be limited to contractual remedies,
which may mean recovery for only the
cost of the appraisal.
Although the economic loss doc-
trine is indeed monolithic for claims
squarely within its coverage-simple
negligence-a buyer-borrower may be
able to maneuver around the bar to re-
covery by recasting the cause of action
as involving additional or intentional
wrongful conduct, such as business
disparagement and intentional interfer-
ence with contract, fraud, or fraudulent
inducement, Zimmerman v. Logeman,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111411 (W.D.
Wis. Dec. 1, 2009), or by establishing an
independent duty. In West v. Inter-Fi-
nancial, Inc., 139 P.3d 1059 (Utah 2006),
the Utah Supreme Court ruled that real
estate appraisers, who are licensed pro-
fessionals, owe duties to third parties
in the performance of their work and
therefore may be liable to third parties
for economic damages as a matter of
law. They have a "statutory duty to the
public" and are expected to be "honest,
ethical, and competent." Id. at 1065. As
such licensed professionals, they can be
held liable for all losses occasioned by
their wrongful conduct, even absent a
formal contractual relationship. Courts
have taken varying views on whether
a claim under Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 552 operates as an exception to
the economic loss rule. Compare Caruso
v. National City Mortg. Co., 187 Ohio
App. 3d 329,334 (2010) (economic dam-
ages recoverable), with Vesta Constr. &
Design, LLC v. Lotspeich & Assoc., 974
So. 2d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(Restatement § 552 is not an exception
to economic loss rule).
A New Regime:
From Tragedy to Morality Play
The 2008 financial industry crisis
seemed a redux of the savings and loan
debacle of the 1980s, when faulty and
fraudulent appraisals played a large
part in the collapse of many savings
and loan institutions. Then, like now,
Congress enacted legislation aimed at
setting standards for competent and
ethical behavior by participants in loan
transactions. The Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3355,
established requirements for real estate
appraisals in federally related transac-
tions. Those standards existed in the
USPAP, but vigorous enforcement was
lacking.
To avert a new tragedy, oversight
of opportunistic players must
come from all fronts. To imple-
ment the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, the
Federal Reserve Board has
adopted a rule that prohibits
coercion by lenders that might
compromise the independent
judgment of appraisers. 12
C.ER. § 226.42(c). The rule
also prevents appraisers and
appraisal management compa-
nies from having financial or
other interests in the properties
or the credit transactions and
makes unlawful the extension
of credit with knowledge of ap-
praiser coercion. Id. § 226.42(d),
(e). Fannie Mae and Freddie




pdf, with the same objectives.
Almost two dozen states have en-
acted legislation based on the Appraisal
Management Company Registration
and Regulation Model Act, created by
The Appraisal Institute (www.
appraisalinstitute.org). See, e.g., Mo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 339.1100-333-1240; Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 62-39-401-62-39-426;
Okla. Stat. §§ 858-801-858-829. The
model act aims to regulate the conduct
of appraisal management companies.
An appraisal management company is
defined as a person who administers
appraisers to fulfill requests for apprais-
al services. See www.appraisalinstitute.
org/newsadvocacy/downloads/
modelprovisionsamc.pdf. Such
companies must register with the board
and otherwise comply with its rules.
The act imposes stringent require-
ments on companies to reduce fraud in
the appraisal process by ensuring the
independent and honest preparation
of appraisal reports. And, beginning
in October 2011, the Federal Hous-
ing Administration will reduce the
maximum value of the homes it will
insure to $625,500 from $729,750. U.S.
Dep't Housing & Urban Dev., Potential
Changes to FHA Single Family Loan Lim-
its Beginning Oct. 1, 2011, http: //portal.
hud.gov/hudportal/documents/
huddoc?id=FHALoan LimitsHERA.
pdf. The former ceiling (adopted in
2008-just as the crisis was taking
shape) for homes in high-priced areas
of the country, surely acted as an incen-
tive toward higher appraisals.
Conclusion
Inflated real estate appraisals played a
critical role in the market bubble that
led to the 2008 financial crisis, but the
appraisers have escaped liability to
consumers in many cases because of
limitations in existing law. What is left
to do now is a reappraisal, not of the
standards for appraiser performance,
but of the standards for holding ap-
praisers to account to those hapless eco-
nomic losers caught in the whirlwinds
of the saga-a recasting from tragedy to
morality play. 0
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